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INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS
The battle over the reach and strength of international protections for intellectual property rights is one of the critical
flashpoints between wealthy and low-income countries: those protections are perceived to obstruct access to essential
medicines, thwart regulatory efforts to promote individual and population health, and undermine traditional forms of
agriculture and food production. While scholars have thoroughly tracked the bilateral and multilateral trade and investment
treaties responsible for the expansion of international intellectual property rights worldwide, they have paid significantly
less attention to the strength and form that opposition to international intellectual property expansion has taken. This
Article examines the proliferation of international legal agreements that carve out special areas of intellectual property for
treatment that differs from protections extended under international trade and investment rules and argues that they should be
reconceived as a unified body of international economic law. Responding to demands from low- and middle-income countries
that benefits from intellectual property protections be more equitably shared, these “international intellectual property
shelters” include the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the World Health Organization's
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Standard Manual Transfer Agreements, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control,
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, and the proposed Medical Research and
Innovation Treaty. This Article analyzes the circumstances that give rise to international intellectual property shelters and
the aspects of intellectual property rights they attempt to regulate. While these shelters are advocated as safeguards for
areas of global public welfare, such as food security and population health, they tend to arise in areas in which a small
number of knowledge-intensive firms dominate global markets. International intellectual property shelters should therefore
be understood as forms of supranational regulation of those firms.
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*905 I. INTRODUCTION
The transition of advanced modern economies from industrial production to knowledge creation and exploitation has
placed the role of intellectual property at the center of fierce debates about economic development, human rights, and the
historical and accelerating concentration of global wealth. As the world's wealthiest countries seek to expand intellectual
property protections through their bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade and investment agreements, the tension
between economic monopoly and access to knowledge embedded in intellectual property's conceptual core has become a
geopolitical flashpoint. Proponents of strong intellectual property protections argue that those protections are necessary
to encourage investment in research and development, which ultimately facilitates technology and knowledge transfer to
low- and middle-income countries. In the face of an exploding HIV/AIDS crisis in South Africa, a representative of global
pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that “[p]atents are the lifeblood of our industry” and insisted that
curtailing patent rights, even to facilitate access to HIV/AIDS medications, would jeopardize the long-term development
of critical medicines: “There is a need not to fight the firefighters.” 1  Critics responded that the protections afforded
intellectual property proprietors, particularly patent and trademark holders, weigh disproportionately in favor of private
rights over social welfare and magnify wealth disparities of all kinds. 2  Environmental activist Vandana Shiva declared
of the international intellectual property regime:
The seed wars, trade wars, patent protection, and intellectual property rights [[[at the World Trade
Organization] are claims to ownership through separation and fragmentation. If the regime of rights being
*906  demanded . . . is implemented, the transfer of funds from poor to rich countries will exacerbate the
Third World crisis 10 times over. 3
Intellectual property protection has dominated international trade and investment negotiations for the last thirty
years, playing a critical role in the success, delay, controversy, or termination of agreements like those overseen by
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), and the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA), to name only the broadest multilateral treaties. 4  Industrialized states successfully tied
the intellectual property protections they desired to the reductions in tariffs and other barriers to imports of foreign
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agricultural, clothing, and textile goods sought by many developing countries, formalized in the WTO's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 5  Thousands of bilateral investment treaties, largely
forged between developed states and developing states, include strong protections for intellectual property rights that
frequently exceed those in existing international agreements, even TRIPS, and certainly those typically found in national
legislative frameworks. 6  This network of agreements has generated a wide range of enforcement mechanisms that reach
beyond the slow and relatively impotent diplomatic methods that characterized the earlier generation of international
intellectual property protections. 7
*907  Confrontations between the growing strength of international intellectual property protections and the
development interests of low- and middle-income countries have correspondingly increased. 8  Strong intellectual
property protections for products and processes relevant to agricultural production, access to medicines, and public
health measures have generated disputes arising under both WTO rules and bilateral and regional trade and investment
agreements. In 1998, pharmaceutical firms holding antiretroviral drug patents brought suit against the South African
government for its efforts to use parallel imports and price controls to expand access to treatment for its exploding
HIV/AIDS population. 9  Their suit was based in significant part on the failure of the government's legislative basis
for the measures to comply with TRIPS. 10  Agriculture and seed companies based in the United States and Europe
have regularly clashed with both farmers in developing countries and their governments over attempts to interrupt
agricultural practices with patent infringement claims. 11  In 2007, Indonesia withheld samples of H5N1 avian influenza
from the World Health Organization (WHO) on the basis that it was commonplace for developing countries to share
their biological resources only to have them exploited, patented, and generated into commercial products priced out of
the reach of consumers in the originating country--a particular problem in the context of medicines and vaccines. 12
These confrontations have resulted in a kind of guerilla warfare against strong international intellectual property
protections, using either loopholes in trade and investment agreements themselves or by developing parallel treaties and
international agreements that cut away at the strength of intellectual property protections. Although there is in fact a
specialized U.N. agency for intellectual property, 13  the World *908  Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), its
membership is dominated by countries leading the opposition to strong international intellectual property protections
and has thus never served as the central forum for the development of substantive international intellectual property
law, focusing instead on coordination and harmonization. 14  The aforementioned agreements themselves do provide
circumscribed limitations. TRIPS, for example, includes provisions encouraging technology transfer and protecting
interests in “public health and nutrition.” 15  Other agreements leave substantial flexibility for implementation, allowing
a country, for example, to devote relatively fewer prosecutorial resources to intellectual property rights enforcement. 16
In the class of approaches identified and analyzed in this Article, negotiators from developed and low- and middle-
income countries target areas of overreach or defectiveness in existing intellectual property protections and draft entirely
new agreements that aim to curtail expansive intellectual property rights or to impose more rigid regimes to force sharing
of innovations and other benefits. I call the subject areas and provisions of these agreements “international intellectual
property shelters,” discrete areas of public concern like access to medicines, agricultural technology, and public health
measures in which the strong intellectual property protections that now prevail under international economic law give
way to realigned incentives for intellectual property rights holders or, in some cases, are jettisoned altogether.
This Article is the first to argue that these international intellectual property shelters--often couched within the
language of biodiversity, public health, and food security--represent a body of international economic law that should
be understood as a single, cohesive phenomenon that has emerged in response to intellectual property protections
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expanding through trade and investment agreements. From the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health (Doha Declaration) 17  to the WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Standard Material Transfer Agreements
(Pandemic *909  Influenza Preparedness Framework) 18  to the proposed Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, 19
international intellectual property shelters put at their core the fundamental distributive questions strong intellectual
property rights raise. The Doha Declaration broke the monopoly patents gave pharmaceutical firms over price structure,
at least for the diseases designated in the agreement. 20  The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework conditioned
pharmaceutical firms' access to influenza biological materials for research and development purposes on donation and
discounted pricing of resulting vaccines and medical countermeasures. 21  The Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) provided a legal basis for many jurisdictions to effectively eliminate tobacco trademarks. 22  These
innovations fundamentally restructured the relationship between innovation, intellectual property, and access otherwise
envisioned in international trade and investment agreements.
This Article also previews two related aspects of these shelters more extensively developed in subsequent work. 23
International intellectual property shelters have emerged not just where an issue of public or global welfare is at stake;
if that were the case, there would be many more of them. Rather, these shelters have tended to emerge in economic
sectors where a small number of global firms dominate. The first shelter, WHO's 1981 International Code of Marketing
of Breast-Milk Substitutes, 24  was essentially created to regulate Nestlé and its 50% global infant formula market
share, although Gerber, Bristol-Myers, and Abbott also maintained substantial global operations. 25  At the time the
International Seed Treaty was formed, four agrochemical firms controlled 56% of the global seed market. 26 *910
Similar concentrations prevailed in the tobacco and pharmaceutical sectors when relevant agreements were initiated
or concluded. 27  Public health, biodiversity, and vaccine sharing treaties are, at least in part, efforts at supranational
regulation of concentrated global industries.
Like domestic regulatory systems, international intellectual property shelters may adopt performance standards,
command-and-control mechanisms, or incentive-based measures to affect firms' behavior. Similarly, international
intellectual property shelters, as supranational regulation, may be captured, co-opted, or diluted in ways that ultimately
undermine their welfare-enhancing or redistributive objectives. While there has been a relatively short time to observe
their influence, some experiences already suggest that some aspects of regime design and participant inclusion may impart
important lessons for future efforts.
Part II of this Article traces the history of international intellectual property protections from the relatively modest and
weak 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) to the contemporary wide
network of bilateral, regional, and multilateral investment and trade treaties with significant enforcement mechanisms. 28
Part III illustrates the tensions generated by expanding international intellectual property protections through episodes
in which strong patent and trademark protections appeared to threaten public health and food security in low- and
middle-income countries. Part IV identifies and analyzes the emergence of international intellectual property shelters:
agreements formed to curtail or eliminate strong intellectual property protections that would otherwise protect patents
and trademarks in critical public health and agricultural sectors. Part V previews two aspects of international intellectual
property shelters relevant not only for understanding why and how they have emerged, but also how they may achieve
their objectives. The first is the relationship between those shelters and concentrated global industries; the second is the
regulatory design each uses to change default international intellectual property protections. Part VI provides a brief
conclusion.
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*911 II. THE GROWING STRENGTH OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS
The growth of intellectual property protections through international legal instruments and treaties has been sweeping
and rapid. 29  Intellectual property protections have expanded not only in terms of their scope, but also in their
enforceability. 30  While patents were protected as early as the 1883 Paris Convention, new international agreements
assert protection over most, if not all, aspects of information submitted to national regulatory authorities in connection
with marketing approvals. 31  Pharmaceutical intellectual property rights, for example, have in many agreements
expanded to include all clinical and animal testing information used to support a patent or approval application. Many
bilateral investment treaties include broadly worded protections for intellectual property (e.g., “know-how”), which
grant parties the right to bring a government before international arbitrators if regulatory measures adversely affect that
right as an “investment.” 32  The end result is that international intellectual property protection is now much stronger
than when it was envisioned toward the end of the nineteenth century. 33
A. The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
The origin of the world's first major intellectual property treaty is traced to an 1873 invitation by the Austro-Hungarian
Empire to foreign governments to participate in an international exhibition of inventions in Vienna. 34  Inventors
hesitated to attend out of fear that their creations would be stolen or copied, leading a small group of states to seek
out a way to protect their citizens' industrial and intellectual property as they moved across borders. 35  The resulting
*912  Paris Convention created a legal union between participating states in which foreign industrial design, patent, and
trademark applications received the same treatment as national applications, obtained priority in other participating
states if first protected in one of the union jurisdictions, and enjoyed substantive protections codified in the treaty. 36
Membership in the Paris Convention grew from 11 parties in 1883 to 174 in 2013. 37
The treaties created reasonable exemptions for covered intellectual properties. Compulsory patent licenses were always
contemplated for public health and national security reasons, while the addition of article 6(B)(iii) in 1934 allowed
the denial of registration or the invalidation of trademarks that could mislead consumers. 38  The WTO's TRIPS later
incorporated the Paris Convention, although TRIPS substantially narrowed its exceptions. 39
The Paris Convention's enforcement mechanisms were almost entirely reputational and diplomatic. 40  In 1967, the
parties agreed to transfer administration of the intellectual property treaties to an international organization, WIPO,
which began operating formally in 1970 and then as a specialized agency of the United Nations starting in *913  1974. 41
WIPO has largely overseen the growing body of intellectual property rights harmonization and coordination treaties
like the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Trademark Law Treaty. 42  Because WIPO became a specialized agency of
the United Nations during the same period that developing and newly independent states were pressing for the New
International Economic Order, WIPO never promoted strong international intellectual property protections. 43
B. International Trade Law
International intellectual property law became decidedly more influential not only when it merged with the international
free trade regime, but also when it became equipped with judicial enforcement requirements that gave intellectual
property right holders the capability to enforce those rights in domestic courts and administrative tribunals. Because the
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS, 90 Tul. L. Rev. 903
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
Paris Convention and other efforts at international intellectual property protection failed to satisfy the demands of states
with strong intellectual property rights-holding constituencies, individual states often regulated intellectual property
practices through domestic trade statutes.
For example, in the United States, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 grants the President the authority to take
necessary action, including retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that
burdens or restricts U.S. commerce and either violates an international trade agreement, discriminates against the United
States, or “imposes unjustifiable or unreasonable barriers” to U.S. commerce. 44  In 1988, the United States Congress
enhanced section 301 by requiring the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to compile “Special 301” Reports,
identifying countries that do not provide “adequate and effective” protection of intellectual property rights or “fair and
equitable market access to United States persons that rely upon intellectual property *914  [rights].” 45  These reporting
mechanisms are a robust source of pressure from knowledge-intensive industries like pharmaceutical firms that maintain
active monitoring and reporting systems for purposes of filing Special 301 complaints. 46  Yet, even efforts like these
confront diplomatic and political limits. Key allies of the United States often appear on the reports, but strong military
ties, for example, are sufficient to deter serious pressure from the U.S. government. Because bilateral pressure was not
sufficient, a broader, multilateral agreement on intellectual property appeared necessary to achieve global protection for
strong intellectual property rights.
1. The WTO
After the failure of the Bretton Woods-envisioned International Trade Organization to materialize, the less centralized
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the organizing treaty under which states reduced official
or governmental barriers to trade. 47  Over eight rounds of negotiations lasting more than forty years, trading states
lowered tariffs as well as “nontariff barriers” to trade like customs procedures, import licensing requirements, and export
subsidies. 48  The so-called Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations commenced in 1986 and lasted through 1994, when
the WTO was established. 49
The “WTO” refers not only to the international facility based in Geneva, but also to about sixty agreements it oversees,
several of which explicitly or implicitly advance strong protections for intellectual property rights. 50  The Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) governs potentially trade restrictive labeling regulations, while TRIPS requires
that states pass laws providing intellectual *915  property rights holders with a number of administrative and judicial
protections. 51  The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) established the principles by which states
may regulate food safety, but its standard-setting body, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), often passes
guidelines and codes of conduct that affect intellectual property rights like trademarks. 52
2. TRIPS
TRIPS is by far the most controversial of the WTO agreements with respect to tensions between wealthy and lower
income states. 53  Unlike the general theory of reducing legal and tax barriers to trade that justified GATT, TRIPS
was theoretically justified by the need to increase the legal protections of intellectual property right holders in order to
facilitate expansion of products and processes (and their distinguishing symbols), as well as creative works, into new
markets. 54
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TRIPS grants patent, copyright, and trademark holders rights to minimal statutory protections as well as the right to
resort to administrative and judicial processes to enforce those rights. 55  Member states may pass protections greater
than those detailed in TRIPS, 56  but additional protections must be extended to nationals of other member states. 57  In
addition to substantive provisions, TRIPS also outlines a comprehensive framework for civil adjudication of intellectual
property rights. 58  Member states must create private causes of action, 59  as well as remedies including injunctions,
money damages, and the use of border restrictions. 60  States must also give intellectual *916  property rights holders
access to judicial review of all administrative decisions concerning their intellectual property laws. 61
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the trade liberalization negotiation process had been driven by the trade priorities of
developed states; the negotiation process largely excluded agriculture and the key bargains were achieved between
industrialized countries. 62  The Uruguay Round, by contrast, encompassed a wider range of issues, many of which
were long-standing priorities of low-and middle-income countries. 63  Their interests in lowering barriers to trade in
agricultural goods, clothes, and textiles resulted in a “grand bargain,” under which the parties agreed to adopt strong
monopoly protections for copyrights, trademarks, and patents. 64
Developing states negotiated some flexibilities with respect to implementation of TRIPS obligations, including articles 7
and 8, which declared the need for intellectual property law to allow for development, technology transfer, and measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition. 65  Those provisions did not provide a general exemption from TRIPS
implementation, but rather conditioned those measures on TRIPS compliance. 66  Article 31 of TRIPS allows for the
nonconsensual authorization of patents, but requires that those authorizations be accompanied by appellate access to
national courts or “higher administrative authorities.” 67
These protections effectively installed a global regime of individually enforceable intellectual property rights. As Jerome
Reichmann observed:
*917  [Developed countries] expect developing countries to implement [their] obligations concerning
domestic judicial and administrative enforcement of foreigners' intellectual property rights, including
detailed provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights to counsel, injunctions, damages, and
temporary restraining orders. These provisions mean business. 68
States party to the agreement are not obliged to spend more resources on enforcement of intellectual property rights than
“law in general,” and thus many individual intellectual property rights holders may not see a sufficient payoff to invest
resources in pursuing individual civil actions to vindicate property rights. But the economic sectors most closely tied
to agriculture and human health--food, tobacco, alcohol, and pharmaceuticals--are precisely those in which intellectual
property rights holders are likely to attempt to preserve substantial investments in advertising, research, and development
and those that most significantly affect the interests of low- and middle-income states. 69
3. ACTA and TPP
TRIPS effectively installed a floor for international intellectual property protections, a floor that subsequent bilateral
and multilateral trade and investment negotiations have sought to surpass. ACTA 70  represents the codification of
principles advanced in a number of initiatives undertaken by developed states to enhance protections for intellectual
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property holders beyond what TRIPS achieved. 71  According to the USTR, “[T]he goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher
benchmark for enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis. . . . ACTA will include commitments in three
areas: (1) strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong legal
framework for IPR *918  [(intellectual property right)] enforcement.” 72  After eleven rounds of negotiations, the final
ACTA text was adopted in May 2011. 73
ACTA requires parties to the agreement to increase criminal sanctions for intellectual property right infringement and
to adopt stronger border measures 74  to target illegal trafficking in infringing goods through customs processes. 75
ACTA requires, under each parties' available laws, “enforcement procedures . . . to permit effective action against
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by [ACTA].” 76  Under ACTA, “Each Party shall make
available to [intellectual property] right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual
property right . . . .” 77  Among those procedures are injunctions, 78  damages, 79  other remedies, 80  and the collection
and preservation of evidence. 81  These civil enforcement provisions are not limited to first-party infringers:
*919  Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, its judicial authorities [shall] have the authority to issue an order against a party to desist
from an infringement and, inter alia, an order to that party or, where appropriate, to a third party over
whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent [infringing] goods . . . from entering
into the channels of commerce. 82
ACTA represents a new restructuring of civil enforcement to increase the rights of intellectual property holders, which
could have potentially deleterious effects on access to medicines. 83  For example, because ACTA requires that judicial
authorities have the power to issue injunctions against third parties, any intermediary provider of generic medicines
to developing countries faces potential liability under the ACTA regime. 84  In the context of access to medicines, the
concept of “intermediary services” may be quite ominous. Services are obviously provided by Intermediary Service
Providers (ISPs), allowing suppliers to market medicines online and in the pharmaceutical context through shipping
agents. Perhaps more ominously, many others who helped fund or facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they moved
through the stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could face intermediary liability. For example,
the Global Fund solicits and funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention, treatment, and care. 85
ACTA compliant laws may enable foreign rights holders to target local industries through threats or use of litigation. 86
The force of the agreement extends beyond its power to shape domestic law because ACTA will inevitably also form the
template for future bilateral agreements between ACTA and non-ACTA states. 87
TPP mimics many of ACTA's intellectual property provisions, although its conclusion is more distant. 88  Congress voted
to give the President fast-track authority to negotiate the agreement, meaning that *920  when TPP is finalized, Congress
must either vote “yes” or “no” and cannot amend it. 89  The text of TPP states that patentability must be permitted for
“new uses of a known product, new methods of using a known product, or new processes of a known product,” suggesting
it would include products that did not improve the known product and that could encompass, in part, evergreening
strategies by pharmaceutical firms. 90  The United States and Japan also proposed a five-year data exclusivity period for
the marketing approval of a new agricultural chemical product, leading to new insecticides, pesticides, and fungicides
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enjoying high prices for at least five years before competitors may use safety and effectiveness data to introduce their
own versions of those products. 91
C. Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment Treaties
More common than broad, multilateral trade instruments like TRIPS, ACTA, and TPP are bilateral and regional
investment and trade agreements, which contain some of the strongest protections for intellectual property. 92  Bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), for example, take a number of forms and include provisions authorizing intellectual property
rights holders to vindicate claims in national or international courts or in other dispute resolution fora. Generally,
BITs are negotiated between developed states and developing states. 93  BITs contain provisions guaranteeing investors
from one state protections for their broadly defined “investments.” These guarantees may include fair and equitable
or nondiscriminatory treatment, 94  free transfer of *921  profits and currency, and, in many cases, payment of
compensation should a host state adopt measures having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation. 95  The origin and
number of BITs in existence is well documented, although the reasons for their proliferation are disputed. 96  At the end
of the 1980s, records at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development showed 385 BITs, while a decade later, the
number reached 1,857. 97  Current estimates show approximately 3,000 BITs in force. 98
These treaties often give much stronger protection, with fewer standard exceptions, to intellectual property rights than
international intellectual property agreements, TRIPS, or domestic law. For example, the standard Swiss BIT protects
as investments “copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents of inventions, utility models, industrial designs
or models, trade or service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellation of origin), know-how and good-
will” and requires the counterparty to compensate an investor for “tak[ing], either directly or indirectly, measures of
expropriation, nationalization or any other measure having the same nature or the same effect.” 99  Under the 2012 U.S.
Model BIT, an “‘investment’ means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . . including
intellectual property rights” that are accorded similar rights to arbitration. 100  For example, drafters of BITs often
vaguely phrase public health exceptions in the preamble, which undermines their use as a defense to an investor claim. 101
BITs often provide investors access to one of the major international arbitral tribunals to vindicate rights under the
agreement. 102
*922 III. INCREASING CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY INTERESTS
The strong substantive and enforcement rights that now prevail for intellectual property rights holders have predictably
encouraged the aggressive policing of those rights. Indeed, large intellectual property rights-holding constituencies, or
coalitions of them, may dedicate resources toward lobbying member governments to bring formal diplomatic action at
the WTO or elsewhere and, if unsuccessful there, to bring arbitration or other enforcement actions under bilateral or
regional trade and investment treaties. 103
Complaints from developing countries take two principal forms. First, the aggressive policing of intellectual
property rights disproportionately affects developing countries' ability to deal with human rights and public welfare
obligations. 104  HIV/AIDS, for example, inflicts its most significant toll in eastern and southern Africa, uniquely
implicating the pricing effect of pharmaceutical patents on relevant medications. 105  Similarly, images, brands, and
trademarks that promote product consumption, while arguably benign in countries with educated, literate populations
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with access to inexpensive consumer information, are more pernicious in countries with high rates of illiteracy. 106
Second, many of the human and natural *923  resources used by innovators to create commercial, scientific, or other
protectable works originate in low- and middle-income countries, yet these works are priced out of reach of the vast
majority of consumers in those countries. 107
These confrontations came to the fore in the wake of TRIPS's entry into force. It marked in fundamental ways the
breadth and depth of the new reach of intellectual property protection. In critical product sectors that affect human
health and nutrition, efforts in low- or middle-income countries (as well as some notable episodes in wealthier ones) to
regulate industries with steep intellectual property investments--like brands, patents, and trademarks-- collided with the
new strength of intellectual property protection driven by bilateral, regional, and multilateral international agreements.
A. Patents and Data Exclusivity
Both international trade law and international investment law have played critical roles in expanding intellectual
property protections for pharmaceutical firms. Leading to the establishment of TRIPS, many low- and middle-income
jurisdictions refused to allow any pharmaceutical patents, arguing that granting them would erect barriers to access to
medicines for their often large and poor populations. 108  TRIPS introduced a twenty-year minimum floor for patents,
including pharmaceuticals, and required that “undisclosed test or other data” be protected from “unfair commercial
use.” 109  Subsequent international agreements not only reinforced that floor, but also included protections for other
aspects of drug development and approval, including marketing exclusion based on animal and clinical testing data used
as part of a regulatory approval. 110  Similar protections were included for seed and other agrochemical products. 111
*924  1. Antiretrovirals
By the early 1990s, the population of people living with HIV/AIDS exploded in Sub-Saharan Africa, quickly comprising
the large majority of the HIV/AIDS-afflicted population worldwide. 112  At the same time, populations living in Africa
tended to have the least access to relatively rapidly developed (and patented) antiretroviral treatments. 113  By 2003,
approximately twenty million people had died from AIDS, and another forty million people were infected with HIV. 114
Africa accounted for two-thirds of the people living with HIV/AIDS, despite holding a relatively small percentage of the
global population. 115  Sometime between 1994 and 2001, South Africa became home to the world's largest population
of people living with HIV/AIDS. 116  While antiretroviral drug treatments had been developed, patented, and approved
as early as 1987, they cost approximately $1,000 per month when the true scope and severity of the HIV/AIDS problem
in South Africa became clear. 117  The South African government regarded expanding access to patented medications
as part of its responsibility under its constitution and announced that pharmaceutical firms' pricing strategies made it
unable to do so. 118  South Africa adopted legislation amending its patent act to authorize parallel imports and to more
steeply regulate available medicines, notwithstanding existing patent rights. 119
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa and the major global pharmaceutical firms individually
sued the government, alleging that the law violated a number of constitutional provisions, including uncompensated
property takings and constitutional commitments to honor obligations under international law generally and TRIPS
specifically. 120  Under the pharmaceutical *925  firms' theory, medicine patents relevant to HIV/AIDS drugs were no
different than other pharmaceutical patents. The same intellectual property principles--exclusivity and monopoly rents
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in exchange for investments in innovation--would lead to the same socially optimal outcomes for HIV/AIDS drugs as
for other medicines. 121
In 1996, Brazil adopted a “local working” requirement as part of its industrial property law, which enabled the Brazilian
government to license patented medicines and technology to other firms for production if the patent was not “worked”
in Brazil. 122  Pharmaceutical firms, which had exported patented medicines to Brazil but had not produced them locally,
immediately protested the measure and, unlike in the dispute with South Africa, convinced the U.S. government to bring
a formal dispute at the WTO for violating TRIPS. 123  Brazil requested consultations under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), alleging that certain aspects of U.S. patent law, particularly those obtained with federal support,
violated TRIPS. 124  The United States and Brazil terminated their dispute in 2001 in the wake of the Doha Declaration
that they jointly drafted. 125  In 2007, Brazil granted a compulsory license for Merck's efavirenz after negotiations over
price reductions failed. 126  Merck filed a motion for injunctive relief, which Brazilian courts rejected. 127
Between 2006 and 2007, Thailand also issued compulsory licenses for Merck's efavirenz and Abbott's liponavir/ritonavir,
noting that discussions with the firms over prices had lasted over two years. 128  After granting the compulsory licenses,
the firms threatened to *926  withdraw or not register other medicines in Thailand and complained to the USTR, but
they ultimately agreed to lower their prices for the medications. 129
In November 2008, Dutch customs agents seized a shipment of HIV/AIDS medications manufactured in India and
destined for Nigeria. 130  GlaxoSmithKline had requested the seizure, claiming that the Indian drug, abacavir, violated
its patent rights. 131  In 2008 and 2009, “Doctors Without Borders found at least 19 shipments of generic medicines from
India to other countries were impounded while in transit in Europe.” 132  The disputes between the parties led to formal
action at the WTO both by European countries and by Brazil and India. 133
2. Cancer, Diabetes, and Heart Disease Medicines
Trade and investment liberalization has promoted the availability of consumer goods that contribute to poor individual
public health--like processed foods containing high levels of fat, salt, and sugar--without promoting the access to
medicines and other healthcare infrastructure that wealthier countries maintain to address so-called “lifestyle” diseases
like cancer, diabetes, and heart disease. 134  Even when these medicines are available in a given market, international
agreements, including and influenced by TRIPS, push prices higher. 135  For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement includes limitations on compulsory licenses and parallel imports. 136  The costliest TRIPS-plus terms are
those that impose “data exclusivity” separate from patent protection. 137  Under data exclusivity regimes, a generic
manufacturer is not allowed to use clinical and safety trial data used with the initial drug application, essentially
requiring the generics applicant to undertake prohibitively expensive clinical trials and *927  reimposing the cost to the
government or end-user that generics theoretically exist to save. 138
“[T]hese expenditures have required that both public health systems and individuals pay higher prices for many new
medicines that are needed to treat [[[diseases] such as [cancer], hypertension, asthma, diabetes, and mental illness.” 139
For example, new medicines to treat diabetes and heart disease cost anywhere from two to six times more in Jordan than
in Egypt, where there are no agreements imposing additional intellectual property protections for pharmaceuticals. 140
Access to these medicines has generated conflicts with strong intellectual property agreements as have medicines
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that prevent or treat infectious diseases that disproportionately affect low- and middle-income countries. Along with
compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs in 2007, Thailand also issued a compulsory license for Plavix, one of the most
prescribed heart disease drugs in industrialized countries. 141  It also announced compulsory licenses for four patented
cancer medications. The Thai government noted that its decision was based on the relative burden each disease imposed
on the Thai people; as many or more people in Thailand die from cancer as AIDS. 142  The Thai licenses prompted
immediate retaliation from Abbott, which withdrew seven medications from the Thai market, and initiated a more
concerted effort by the United States and from European countries to pressure the Thai government. 143
3. Vaccines
The development of some vaccines, notably those that protect against influenza, depends on biological resources in
low- and middle-income countries being made available to researchers, organizations, governments, and pharmaceutical
firms in the major industrialized *928  countries. Vaccines are one of the most important lines of defense against the
emergence of pandemics. 144  Not only are vaccines typically patented, but so are components of vaccines that make
them more effective. 145  Seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines are possible in significant part because developing
countries share influenza samples with the WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, even though
their populations have not historically received a proportionate benefit of resulting vaccines or other breakthroughs. 146
The infrastructure and technology for vaccine development is overwhelmingly located in industrialized, wealthy
states. 147  This concentration renders many developing states dependent on wealthier states to manufacture and
distribute vaccines in sufficient quantities to address their needs in the case of disease outbreaks. 148  Yet influenza
pandemics have typically originated in low- or middle-income states like Cambodia, Indonesia, Mexico, and
Vietnam. 149  These states must therefore be willing to share disease samples and biological material relevant to risk
assessment, risk management, disease research, and vaccine development. 150  When firms patent shared samples to
produce unaffordable vaccines, the willingness to share them is undermined. 151
*929  In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from the WHO system, compromising efforts to monitor and
produce vaccines in response to an avian flu outbreak that had not only spread worldwide, but also threatened to become
easily transmissible from birds to humans and then between humans. 152  Indonesia asserted that its decision was a
response to an Australian company's development of a vaccine derived from a virus sample that Indonesia provided to the
WHO. 153  The cycle demonstrated the inequities inherent in the global vaccine distribution system: developing countries
provided informa-tion and virus samples to the WHO-operated system; pharmaceutical companies in industrialized
countries then obtained free access to such samples, exploited them, and patented the resulting products, which the
developing countries could not afford. 154  As David Fidler noted, “Without access to Indonesia's influenza strains,
global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement of diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention
strategies, which depend on the information surveillance provides.” 155
In 2009, the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in Mexico demonstrated not only that the global surveillance system benefited
pharmaceutical firms, but also that in the case of a real pandemic, those firms' sponsoring governments could not be
relied upon to equitably share vaccines:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company because it feared that foreign governments
might restrict exports to Canada because of vaccine shortages within their territories. The Australian
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government made it clear to the Australian manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government's domestic
needs before exporting vaccine to the United States. The United States pledged on September 17, 2009,
to donate 10% of its vaccine purchases to WHO, but on October 28, US Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that the United States would not donate H1N1 vaccine as promised
until all at risk Americans had access, because production problems had created shortages in the United
States. 156
*930  Despite clear acknowledgment that the 2009 outbreak originated in Mexico and leveled its most significant toll
there, Mexico “had a terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine.” 157
4. Seeds and Agrochemical Products
Just as spreading intellectual property protections stymied efforts by developing states to adopt measures against
malnutrition and infectious disease, they also undermined those states' policies toward food self-sustainability and
traditional processes for the preservation of biological and plant resources. 158  This confrontation was already well
underway when TRIPS was negotiated, and it was essentially codified in article 27.3(b), which allows countries to
exclude “plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” from patentable subject matter, 159  but requires
protection for plant varieties either through patents or through a sui generis system like the International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), leaving “micro-organisms” undefined. 160
Patented seeds, tailored pesticides, insecticides, and fungicides, at a general level, interrupt or displace traditional forms of
agriculture predominant in low- and middle-income countries. 161  Philippe Cullet described the change from traditional
forms of agriculture, including seed exchange and crop rotation, to dependence on patented seeds and related products
in Africa:
The introduction of plant variety protection in African countries is a novelty for all but a few states. It
constitutes a significant departure from previous practice which generally emphasized the free sharing of
knowledge at all levels. The challenge is further compounded by the fact that plant variety protection has
until now only been introduced in countries with relatively small but highly industrialized agricultural
sectors. 162
*931  From low- and middle-income countries' perspective, implementing intellectual property protected seeds and
agricultural products in relatively undeveloped agricultural markets essentially redistributes wealth from farmers to the
small number of global seed and agribusiness firms that dominate the global market. 163  Farmers pay high prices for
seeds and products to treat the crops that grow from them, while prices for the resulting commodities are pressured lower
by a small number of global food firms. 164  Indeed, as early as 1999--four years after TRIPS became international law--
African countries sought to revisit the scope and reach of article 27: 165
The African Group seized the opportunity of the provision and prepared a strongly worded communication
during the preparations for the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle [in 1999], which vehemently questioned
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the overall provisions of Article 27.3(b). The Group suggested that the revision of the article should take into
account the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as the FAO International Undertaking. Insinuating
that a review of 27.3(b) could lead to changes in its substantive nature, the Group highlighted the artificial
distinctions that it made “between biological and microbiological organisms and processes.” 166
B. Trademarks
While patents and data exclusivity have generated the widest controversies affecting food security, nutrition, and public
health measures, trademarks have caused similar disputes between low- and middle-income countries and firms with
steep investments in symbols, logos, and distinguishing marks that could mislead or deceive consumers in those states,
many of which suffer high rates of illiteracy. 167  As a result of the conditions prevailing in many low-and middle-income
countries, product appearance plays a different, arguably more important, role in consumption, and, therefore, product
image and visuals around point of sale are critical for both commercial and regulatory objectives. 168
*932  1. Infant Formula
While maternal behavior with respect to breastfeeding varies in industrialized countries, little evidence suggests a
significant effect on infant, maternal, or population health. In low- and middle-income countries, however, failure to
breastfeed has relevant health effects on infants, mothers, and families. 169  In areas with low levels of education, people
often fail to properly mix formula and, even when done correctly, infant formula may introduce contaminants from
nearby water sources. 170  Senator Ted Kennedy phrased the problem this way: “Can a product which requires clean
water, good sanitation, adequate family income, and a literate parent to follow printed instructions be properly and
safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage runs in the streets, poverty is severe and illiteracy high?” 171
In one tragic episode, parents in Laos confused a red label Bear Brand coffee creamer (a Nestlé trademark), the logo
of which features a mother bear holding her cub in the nursing position, for a breast-milk substitute, notwithstanding
written warnings that the product was not intended for infants for any reason. 172  The confusion resulted in cases of
both malnutrition and death. 173
The WHO estimates that 13% of the 10.9 million deaths of children younger than five years could be prevented every
year if universal protection, promotion, and support of breastfeeding were achieved. 174  Exclusive breast-feeding for the
first six months of life is the number one intervention to save infants' lives. 175  Breastfeeding also plays a role in spacing
pregnancies where contraception is unavailable or contraception failures are common. 176
*933  Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, breastfeeding rates in low- and middle-income countries declined, which
the WHO and governments in those countries attributed to food firms' marketing of infant formula, other milk products,
cereals for infants, vegetable mixes, and baby teas and juices. 177  Those firms' marketing practices explicitly asserted
or implied nutritional and other health equivalencies with, or superiority to, breastfeeding. 178  Many low- and middle-
income countries adopted national measures to control the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, including the use of
images and brands to confuse the health-related attributes of breast-milk substitute products. 179
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In 1983, Guatemala adopted Law 66-83, Law on the Protection of Breastfeeding, which restricted the ability of breast
milk substitute manufacturers to display images, brands, or trademarks that could lead its substantially illiterate
population to believe that breast milk substitutes provided an adequate and effective alternative to breastfeeding during
the first six months of infants' lives. 180  The Ministry of Health implemented the law through Governmental Order No.
847-87 in 1987. 181  Gerber--whose products carry one of the most recognizable trademarks worldwide, a healthy smiling
baby--applied to introduce a new product line in Guatemala in 1992: 182
[Gerber] requested that the products be registered with the Food & Drugs Registration and Control Division
[an equivalent of the United States FDA]. The FDRC required that Gerber remove its trademarked infant
image, include a notice that “breastmilk is the best for baby” as required under the law and further specify
the age of the child for which the products were intended. 183
Gerber responded by pursuing a three-pronged strategy: Gerber asserted that its products were “complementary” foods
under Guatemalan law and therefore not covered by Laws 66-83 and 841-87 and brought a statutory action under U.S.
law to eliminate Guatemala's trading preferences for effectively “nationalizing” its trademark, threatening Guatemala's
compliance with (still pending) TRIPS *934  provisions. 184  Gerber argued that article 15 of TRIPS states, “The nature
of the goods or services to which a trademark is to be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the
trademark.” 185  In addition, article 20 of the proposed agreement provides that “[t]he use of a trademark in the course
of trade shall not be unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as . . . use in a special form or use in a
manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods.” 186  The Guatemala Supreme Court of Justice, applying
a strained interpretation of “complementary foods,” determined that Laws 66-83 and 841-87 applied only to locally
prepared foods, not to imported goods. 187  Without explicitly acknowledging the role that the trade-based agreements
played in their construction of the law, the case “shows . . . that raising the spectre of the new WTO can be an effective
pressure tool against small countries that want to implement strong health regulations that may also have negative
impacts on commercial interests.” 188
The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines successfully delayed and then earned relief from
comprehensive breast milk labeling restrictions through similar arguments based in part on the trade-restrictive effect
of warnings on formula containers. 189  Even in countries that have more successfully regulated the marketing of breast-
milk substitutes, like India, food firms exploit ambiguities in statutory and regulatory language to continue practices
that imply the superiority of substitutes over breast milk. 190
*935  2. Tobacco
The burden of smoking-related morbidity and mortality has shifted dramatically to low- and middle-income countries.
Nearly 80% of the more than one billion smokers worldwide live in low- and middle-income countries, where the burden
of tobacco-related illness and death is heaviest. 191  Tobacco consumption is, among other things, an economic and
development issue. Tobacco users who die prematurely deprive their families of income, raise the cost of health care,
and hinder economic development. 192
For this reason, low- and middle-income countries led some of the earliest and strongest challenges to marketing
efforts by tobacco firms, which relied heavily on investments in brands, images, and trademarks. 193  In 1994, South
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Africa introduced “regulations relating to the Labelling, Advertising and Sale of Tobacco Products,” which would
have required 25% of advertisements and 50% of the front and back panels of cigarette packs to carry eleven different
rotating warnings. 194  The then-president and CEO of Philip Morris International (PMI), William H. Webb, wrote a
strongly worded letter implicitly threatening foreign investment in South Africa and detailing the violations the law would
cause South Africa “under its internal laws and as a party to The Paris Convention for the Protection of International
Property Rights [including trademark infringement] assurances to international consumer products companies that their
trademark rights will be respected” and protected from outright expropriation. 195  RJR Nabisco focused its lobbying
effort “on international trade aspects of the potential trademark infringement the new regulations would create.” 196
The final implementing regulations *936  halved the coverage of cigarette packs and reduced the number of rotating
warnings. 197
Between 2008 and 2010, Uruguay implemented a number of tobacco control measures, including two that addressed the
manipulation of packaging and labeling to shape health perceptions of tobacco products. First, Uruguay required that
pictorial warnings cover 80% of a cigarette pack's surface. Second, the Ministry of Health limited the sale of cigarettes
to only one variety per brand, the so-called single presentation requirement. 198  This part of the law prevents a firm
from selling multiple varieties of cigarettes under a single trademark. For example, PMI, whose most important asset
is the Marlboro brand, could no longer sell Marlboro “Reds,” Marlboro “Greens,” and Marlboro “Blues,” leaving
“Marlboros” as its only authorized variety. 199  PMI first challenged the regulations in Uruguayan courts, seeking an
injunction based in part on Uruguay's revised, TRIPS-compliant trademark law. 200  Unsuccessful in Uruguayan courts,
PMI initiated, through entities it controlled, arbitration proceedings under Switzerland's BIT with Uruguay. 201  That
treaty included not only broad definitions of “investor” and “investment,” but also established narrow and toothless
exceptions for public health regulation and even required laws passed with assurance *937  of due process to compensate
an investor for an “indirect” expropriation. 202
Low- and middle-income countries were not the only ones facing international intellectual property challenges.
Contesting Australia's 1992 effort to require tobacco manufacturers to sell cigarettes in plain packaging, British
American Tobacco argued before the Australian Senate that such a law would violate both the Paris Convention and
the Australian constitution. 203  Persuaded by the tobacco industry, the Australian government rejected the proposed
regulations. 204  In 1994, PMI and RJR Reynolds undertook a similarly successful campaign in Canada, based in
significant part on the intellectual property protection provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and deputized the former USTR to send a letter on their behalf, suggesting that plain packaging of cigarettes
would subject Canada to an arbitration proceeding for violating NAFTA's intellectual property chapter. 205
Low- and middle-income countries have led efforts to regulate the reach of intellectual property protections for tobacco
trademarks because the health burdens imposed by the consumption that trademarks promote fall disproportionately
on their populations.
IV. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS
Scholars, as well as low- and middle-income countries, have advanced a number of measures to address the perceived
imbalance rendered by the structure of existing agreements, some more practical than others. Kojo Yelpaala has written
a searing indictment of the international intellectual property regime and has implicitly called for its ouster: 206
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It is now widely acknowledged by most observers that TRIPS is a serious threat to human health security. . . .
Before TRIPS, over forty *938  countries offered no patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions. Such
sovereign authority of states has been compromised by TRIPS as part of the WTO system of agreements. . . .
This exploitation of the inequalities of bargaining power was undertaken at a time when many developing
countries were ill equipped or unprepared to appreciate all the implications of TRIPS. 207
On August 26, 2004, Argentina and Brazil sponsored a resolution at WIPO, calling for a “development agenda” to guide
WIPO's activities, a moratorium on new international agreements that “expand and strengthen monopolies and further
restrict access to knowledge,” and the formation of a “Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology,” which would
essentially roll back expansive protections for copyrights, patents, and trademarks. 208
While the more sweeping proposals have not gained much ground, movements across certain kinds of treaties, or
mechanisms within certain treaties, reflect a consensus that international intellectual property law has overreached. Some
states are revising or withdrawing from agreements with strong intellectual property protections. 209  Other solutions
involve explicit limitations on the adjudicatory rights private parties enjoy under bilateral or multilateral instruments. 210
Low- and middle-income states have also started to press for specific intellectual property regimes in discrete issue areas
like seeds and agricultural technology, vaccines, and other medicines and product *939  sectors like alcohol, infant
formula, and tobacco. Within these issue areas, what this Article terms “international intellectual property shelters”
are changing or eliminating strong intellectual property rights guaranteed under other international agreements. From
access to medicines to the protection of biological resources (including seeds) to the protection of populations from
tobacco advertising and other health threats, a set of international agreements has emerged that either have jettisoned
intellectual property rights in specific issue areas or have reengineered the way intellectual property protection incentives
function. 211
A. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
The 2001 Doha Declaration remains the most famous international intellectual property shelter. Formed to safeguard
low- and middle-income countries' access to medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and “other epidemics,”
the Doha Declaration established that treatments for diseases affecting low- and middle-income countries deserve
different treatment than the typical intellectual property-based exclusivity and price structure characteristic of the
regime favored by TRIPS. 212  Instead, afflicted countries should, and ultimately do, enjoy greater flexibility to control
monopoly prices that strong intellectual property rights cause. On the other hand, the Doha Declaration also implied that
coercive mechanisms to acquire or discount non-HIV, -tuberculosis, or -malaria treatments would not be as favorably
received. 213
Between 1994, when TRIPS was finalized, and June 2001, when the TRIPS Council opened a special session to discuss
access to medicines under the agreement, the disproportionate effect of HIV/AIDS on developing countries became clear,
as did the contrast between global pharmaceutical firms' perspective on what TRIPS *940  accomplished and what
developing countries feared. 214  Many developing states considered the high prices that accompanied patented medicines
and their production processes to frustrate their constitutional and international human rights obligations to provide
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affordable health care to their citizens. The Doha Declaration essentially created a TRIPS-free zone for government
policies aimed at assuring access to medicines for the three designated diseases and perhaps other “epidemics.”
Paragraph 5 of the 2001 Doha Declaration provided:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in
particular, in its objectives and principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licences are granted.
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency. 215
Concurrently with the Doha Declaration, Japan introduced the idea of a global fund for the treatment of HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, which materialized in 2003. 216  The Doha Declaration by its terms carved out HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria as diseases for which the rewards for medical research and innovation could be
expected to function differently than the patent-and-reward system pharmaceutical firms envisioned when challenging
Brazil's and South Africa's measures to reduce antiretroviral drug prices. 217  Together with the Global Fund and
other international financing mechanisms, the Doha Declaration redistributed default monopoly rents that pharma-
ceutical patents previously directed to the major pharmaceutical firms to generics firms in middle-income countries
that (1) possessed the manufacturing capacity to exploit the new market the Doha *941  Declaration opened and (2)
enjoyed sufficient influence internationally to exploit that capacity without alienating states that advocated for strong
pharmaceutical patent rights. 218  Indeed, since 1995, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Thailand have led in using parallel
imports, TRIPS flexibilities, and compulsory licenses to expand access to medicines for their own populations, as well
as to obtain collective gains for developing countries. 219
It was and is conceivable that the Doha Declaration may have energized more aggressive compulsory licensing activity
outside of the diseases explicitly named in the agreement. In 2007, Thailand granted a compulsory license for the heart
disease medication marketed as Plavix. 220  Thailand also issued compulsory licenses for four cancer drugs, the disease
burden of which is heavier than HIV/AIDS. 221  From the Thai government's point of view, cancer “is no less serious
than HIV/AIDS.” 222  In 2012, India granted a compulsory license for kidney and liver cancer medications, but refused to
grant several recent compulsory license applications. 223  Indeed, since 1995, “[m]ore than half the compulsory licensing
episodes occurred in upper-middle-income countries (including Brazil and Thailand).” 224  Retaliatory measures by both
governments and manufacturers have pushed innovators and governments to the bargaining table. Compulsory license
activity has abated since the Doha Declaration, with the enhanced bargaining power of developing states leading to more
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effective direct negotiations between manufacturers and governments. 225  No substantial wave of compulsory licensing
activity has occurred. 226
*942  So what did the Doha Declaration do? 227  It is difficult to answer the question without also analyzing the
mushrooming of global medicines funding institutions that accompanied the Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration
certainly pushed patent-holding firms to the negotiating table with middle-income countries that possessed the
manufacturing capacity to make compulsory licensing threats credible and gave those countries particular negotiating
leverage in the discrete disease categories named by the Doha Declaration--HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. At
the same time, however, the establishment of the Global Fund, Gavi (which has strongly suggested that it would finance
an HIV vaccine should one be developed), 228  and the increase in health aid both to individual ministries of health
and indirectly through the Global Fund, such as the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), 229
the rents pharmaceutical patent holders would have obtained under the old system have been partially replaced by the
incentive to win opportunities through international funding mechanisms. Thus the major pharmaceutical firms have
developed extensive relationships with ministries of health in less developed countries, and pharmaceutical pricing is
more often undertaken collaboratively.
B. The Proposed Medical Research and Innovation Treaty
The controversies leading up to the Doha Declaration prompted a broader movement supporting an international
agreement to restructure intellectual property incentives in the access-to-medicines context. To be sure, part of the larger
problem was that monopoly rents supported by patents, trademarks, trade dress, and data *943  exclusivity rendered
medicines like antiretrovirals, cancer treatments, and diabetes-control drugs out of reach for low- and middle-income
countries. But a similar, if not larger, part of the problem was that drug innovation and development did not occur for
Type II and Type III diseases that primarily afflicted low- and middle-income countries. 230  The diseases for which the
market would likely be paltry attracted little research and development funding. 231
In 2005, Kenya submitted a resolution to the WHO's Executive Board requesting the creation of a group of member
states to discuss a new global framework on medical research and development. 232  In January 2006, Brazil joined the
resolution as a cosponsor, 233  requesting such a framework. 234  In May 2006, the World Health Assembly (WHA)
adopted Resolution 59.24--Public Health, Innovation, Essential Health Research and Intellectual Property Rights--
which called for an intergovernmental working group to study the relationship between intellectual property rights, other
forms of financing, and the global problem of diseases unlikely to attract purely private-sector attention. 235  In 2012,
the WHO's Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination (CEWG)
published Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and
Coordination, which called for a binding framework treaty to address innovation and research capacity in developing
*944  countries and to design a system to promote development of treatments through incentive and other financing
mechanisms. 236
The CEWG's report extensively covered the obstacles strong intellectual property protections pose for addressing medical
research and development needs in developing countries. 237  The report squarely addressed existing intellectual property
instruments, viewing a medical research and innovation “convention not as a replacement for the existing intellectual
property rights system but as a supplementary instrument where the current system does not function” and emphasizing
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the need for research and development breakthroughs to be shared with other researchers, free from the constraints
intellectual property protections normally impose. 238
For example, for Type II and Type III diseases that dispropor-tionately affect populations in developing countries,
the CEWG recommends a binding international treaty that provides for open innovation models in which (1) research
and development costs are covered by public or philanthropic sources and research results are made available in the
public domain; (2) funders or research organizations impose licensing conditions that permit nonexclusive licensing or
prescribe a low target price for a product; (3) advance market commitments or prize funds that involve separate payments
compensate for the costs of research and development, prescribing either predetermined product prices at a low level
or permitting competitive manufacture of developed products; and (4) more comprehensive schemes envisage wholesale
replacement of the intellectual property innovation and exclusivity system. 239
Deep divides still stand in the way of the formation of the agreement. Brazil, Kenya, and the many low- and middle-
income countries that stand to gain from a treaty allocating more resources to research into neglected diseases and
diluting intellectual property rights in general support the proposed treaty. European countries, especially those with
large pharmaceutical firms, have *945  overwhelmingly opposed it. 240  In 2013, the United States proposed a series of
demonstration projects that might bridge the current, deep divides between member states over the treaty's terms. 241
C. The WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework
Indeed, the kind of regime envisioned by the medical research and innovation treaty exists to some degree in the
limited context of pandemic influenza. Indonesia's refusal to share avian flu samples on the basis of inequities in
the global vaccine development and distribution system, along with the catastrophic potential of the 2009 H1N1
episode, encouraged pharmaceutical firms, the WHO, wealthy countries, and poor ones to address the balance between
intellectual property rights in shared biological resources and the products resulting from that sharing system. 242
In 2007, the WHA commenced a series of negotiations over “sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and
other benefits,” in light of Indonesia's refusal to share critical virus samples. 243  Disagreements over the extent to which
vaccine manufacturers' intellectual property rights should be diluted or eliminated erected critical barriers to early
negotiations. 244  The failure of H5N1 to become a pandemic influenza episode reduced the significance of Indonesia's
refusal to participate in sample sharing. In 2009, however, the emergence of H1N1 in Mexico and the United States 245
rendered the negotiations more urgent.
As a result of these episodes, developing countries, led by Indonesia, pressed both the WHO and developed states to
conclude an agreement on equitable access to pandemic vaccines. In 2011, the WHO Open-Ended Working Group of
Member States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) finalized an agreement in which developing countries agreed
to routinely share mutating flu virus *946  samples in exchange for a series of measures taken under the auspices of the
newly formed Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework. 246
Under the Framework, major pharmaceutical manufacturers retain their ability to access samples shared through the
WHO's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System, but now firms using the system must contribute towards
half the cost of its maintenance (approximately $30 million annually) and must promise to share either intellectual
property, products developed through use of the system, or other medical countermeasures critical to pandemic
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response. 247  For manufacturers of vaccines and/or antivirals, the recipient shall commit to at least two of the following
options:
A1. Donate at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production to WHO.
A2. Reserve at least 10% of real time pandemic vaccine production at affordable prices to WHO.
A3. Donate at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic to WHO.
A4. Reserve at least X treatment courses of needed antiviral medicine for the pandemic at affordable prices.
A5. Grant to manufacturers in developing countries licenses on mutually agreed terms that should be fair
and reasonable including in respect of affordable royalties, taking into account development levels in the
country of end use of the products, on technology, know-how, products and processes for which it holds
IPR for the production of (i) influenza vaccines, (ii) adjuvants, (iii) antivirals and/or (iv) diagnostics.
A6. Grant royalty-free licenses to manufacturers in developing countries or grant to WHO royalty-free,
non-exclusive licenses on IPR, which can be sublicensed, for the production of pandemic influenza vaccines,
adjuvants, antivirals products and diagnostics needed in a pandemic. WHO may sublicense these licenses to
manufacturers in developing countries on appropriate terms and conditions and in accordance with sound
public health principles. 248
Because a subsequent pandemic influenza episode has yet to emerge to test the system, it is too early to know
whether the Framework will achieve its objectives. Key terms like “pandemic,” “real-time,” and *947  “affordable”
are left undefined, at least in the core agreements, and those terms caused substantial problems during the WHO's
negotiation, procurement, and deployment of pandemic vaccine in 2010. 249  Nevertheless, the Framework can be
plausibly understood to be the result of low- and middle-income countries changing the international intellectual
property regime both ex ante (through access to materials for research and development) and ex post (through sharing
of intellectual property-generated products).
D. The Convention on Biological Diversity
While often tied to its sibling treaty, the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (and less so the U.N.
Convention To Combat Desertification) as an outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the Convention
on Biological Diversity not only endeavored to create worldwide agreement on the conservation of biodiversity and
sustainable practices for plant genetic resources, but it also established a general regime for “access and benefit sharing”
of a kind arguably at odds with its other two objectives; however, it proved fruitful for finding legal bases to shape or
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curtail intellectual property rights. 250  Indeed, in its dispute with the WHO and wealthy countries in 2007, Indonesia
cited the Convention on Biological Diversity as one of its legal justifications for withholding H5N1 virus samples. 251
After the Convention went into force, it has served as a primary focal point for low- and middle-income countries to
revisit and advocate for amendment of TRIPS, as well as to develop subsequent treaties that target intellectual property
protections in a range of ways. 252  The Convention's goal of “access and benefit sharing” includes both plant genetic
resources as well as the relevant technology associated with their development, 253  and it specifically ties terms of access
to intellectual property rights, providing that “patents and other *948  intellectual property rights may have an influence
on the implementation of [the Convention, and thus parties] shall cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives.” 254
The Convention asks parties to take legislative, administrative, or policy measures “as appropriate” to implement
the Convention's goals. 255  This has led to broad diversity in implementation strategies between nations, 256  with
many seeking to protect their resources, rather than facilitating access and benefit sharing, and others essentially using
the Convention to obtain favorable terms for commercial exploitation, arguably in tension with the Convention's
conservation objective. 257  This latter phenomenon puts signatory governments and farmers at odds in several different
ways because while the biological resources belong to the sovereign government, farmers' rights are not addressed in the
text of the Convention. 258
The Convention relies on bilateral contracts between parties and the linear movement of plant genetic resources from the
field to commercial development, using negotiation with the sovereign state to facilitate access and sharing of benefits. 259
This method treats plant genetic resources as if they are private goods and opens possibilities for arrangements that
modify intellectual property rights. 260  In addition, the Convention encourages parties to disclose the country of origin
of plant genetic resources in their applications for intellectual property rights. 261
*949  1. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (International Seed Treaty)
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (International Seed Treaty) in many
ways embodies a disagreement between North American, European, and Japanese governments and low- and middle-
income countries that begins with article 27 of TRIPS. Low- and middle-income countries always maintained that article
27 was inconsistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity. The Treaty was adopted on November 3, 2001, after
a seven-year negotiation process 262  and entered into force in 2004. 263  The International Seed Treaty is a protocol
adopted pursuant to the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (Undertaking) and the Convention on
Biological Diversity, intended to update the Undertaking and make it legally binding. 264
The Undertaking, adopted in 1983, 265  is an international instru-ment aimed at encouraging international cooperation
in the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources. 266  It originally advocated the view that plant genetic
resources are a common heritage of humanity and should be freely available without restriction. 267  This view was later
qualified by several resolutions which amended the Undertaking. Resolution 4/89 recognized plant breeders' and farmers'
rights, subjecting free availability to property rights. 268  However, these “rights” are merely recognition without force--
no individual rights are enumerated in the resolution. 269  Resolution 3/91 went a step further by recognizing the sovereign
rights of nations over plant genetic resources within their territories. 270
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In an effort to update the goals of the Undertaking and the Convention on Biological Diversity and to make them legally
binding, negotiations on the International Seed Treaty began in 1994. 271  These *950  included matters of extensive
debate, such as access and benefit sharing, farmers' rights, and financial resources, but an informal meeting of negotiators
in Switzerland overcame these differences in 1999. 272  The parties agreed on which crops to include on the Treaty's Annex
1 list and compromised on intellectual property rights in April 2001. 273  The International Seed Treaty does not include
plant genetic resources not on the Annex 1 list, which remain under the legal framework of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, as do resources accessed for nonagricultural purposes. 274  In June 2001, parties agreed to a multilateral system
for access and benefit sharing. 275
Two major provisions of the International Seed Treaty affect intellectual property rights. First, the Treaty recognizes
farmers' rights. 276  Second, the Treaty creates a multilateral system for access and benefit sharing. 277  Article 9 of the
Treaty enumerates three elements of farmers' rights: (1) the protection of relevant traditional knowledge, (2) the right
of farmers to participate equitably in sharing benefits arising from the utilization of plant genetic resources, and (3) the
right of farmers to participate in decision making at national levels. 278  Article 9 also states, “Nothing in this Article
shall be interpreted to limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating
material, subject to national law and as appropriate.” 279  Article 15 of the Treaty recognizes that states hold sovereign
authority over their own natural resources. 280  As with the Undertaking, these provisions essentially create intellectual
property rights held by farmers and nations over plant genetic resources that previously did not exist. 281
The Treaty's multilateral system for access and benefit sharing also affects intellectual property rights. The multilateral
system is *951  primarily composed of two parts: the Annex 1 list of plant genetic resources 282  and the Material Transfer
Agreement (Agreement). 283  Annex 1 lists thirty-five specific crops to which the Treaty applies. 284  Access to these
resources is limited to those under the management and control of the public domain or in the gene banks of international
institutions. 285  However, the Treaty does require parties to take measures to encourage natural and legal persons in
their jurisdictions to grant access to privately held plant genetic resources. 286
The Agreement provides for facilitated access to plant genetic resources, benefit sharing mechanisms of the Treaty, and
any associated intellectual property rights. 287  Facilitated access is subject to both intellectual property rights and plant
breeders' rights, and access to material under development remains under the discretion of the developer. 288  In exchange
for facilitated access, recipients are prohibited from seeking intellectual property rights on plant genetic resources in the
form received from the multilateral system, including parts and components of such resources. 289
Facilitated access itself is a benefit under the International Seed Treaty, but the Treaty and the Agreement also provide
for the sharing of monetary benefits, 290  improved plant genetic resources, 291  and technology and information. 292
Annex 2 of the Agreement triggers monetary benefits when a recipient commercializes a product from the plant genetic
resources received and when that product is not available without restriction to others for further research and breeding
purposes. 293  This provision effectively discourages the use of patents, other intellectual property rights, or other
contractual or technological methods that achieve the same effect. 294
After the expiration of any intellectual property rights, recipients are encouraged to place a sample of their products into a
collection *952  that is part of the multilateral system. 295  In addition, they are also required to share all nonconfidential
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information about the improved plant genetic resources that result from the recipient's research and development
processes. 296  Recipients who commercialize a product are also encouraged to make monetary contributions, although
they are not presently required to do so. 297  These measures are intended to establish and strengthen conservation and
scientific research in developing countries. 298
In response to the Treaty, some nations have proposed or adopted liberal legislation to protect the rights of farmers. 299
African Model Legislation suggests that countries recognize and protect farmers' varieties and breeds that do not meet
the criteria of distinction, uniformity, and stability 300  traditionally required for intellectual property protections, such
as plant breeders' rights. 301  It also provides farmers with the right to participate in decision making on matters related
to conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources; the right to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seeds
both individually and collectively; and the right to use protected breeders' varieties to develop new farmers' varieties. 302
Under this model legislation, farmers still may not sell farm-saved seeds of a breeders' protected variety at commercial
sales. 303
India has likewise developed liberal legislation protecting farmers' rights. 304  India adopted the Protection of Plant
Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act in 2001. 305  This Act permits farmers to protect and recognize farmers' varieties,
which are defined broadly as “ha[ving] been traditionally cultivated and evolved by the farmers in their fields; or [are]
wild relative[[[s] or land race[s] of a variety about which farmers possess common knowledge.” 306  As with the African
Model Legislation, farmers are permitted to save, use, sow, resow, exchange, *953  share, or sell farm produce and
protected varieties of seeds as long as the seeds are not sold commercially. 307  These provisions allow countries like India
and Zambia to protect farmers commercially by granting them intellectual property rights, promote conservation and
stewardship by the farming community, and limit the power of intellectual property rights held by third parties. 308
Other countries have failed to implement legislation that adequately protects farmers 309  or implements the Treaty. 310
This is largely due to the fact that the International Seed Treaty does not actually require parties to legally recognize
farmers' rights to freely exchange and use harvested seeds. 311  The fact that several of the world's largest holders of
plant genetic resources, such as the United States, China, Russia, and Japan, have not ratified the Treaty limits the
overall effectiveness of the Treaty. 312  As a result, they have not passed legislation to effectively share and receive benefits
through the multilateral system. 313
Aside from the failure of key states to ratify and others to implement legislation, the International Seed Treaty's text
itself includes weaknesses that open its access and benefit provisions to vulnerabilities against international intellectual
property agreements. 314  The provision prohibiting recipients from taking out intellectual property rights on plant
genetic resources in the form received from the multilateral system fails to define what “in the form they are received”
means or what degree of alteration or change is required to allow recipients to seek intellectual property rights. 315
Some countries interpret the language to mean that the Treaty will not impinge on national intellectual property rights,
laws, or policies. 316  The EU understands that parts and components that are subject to innovation can be protected
by intellectual property rights. 317  Developing *954  countries, on the other hand, interpret this provision as per se
disfavoring applications for intellectual property rights that could restrict access to plant genetic resources. 318
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The International Seed Treaty is new, and therefore no consensus exists as to whether it has been effective in achieving
its objectives or limiting the assertion of intellectual property rights over plant genetic resources. 319  However, at least
in the arena of advancing farmers' rights, it does seem to have been somewhat successful in countries, such as India and
Zambia, that have enacted legislation granting farmers broad rights to use, save, exchange, and sell seeds. 320
2. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol) aimed to encompass the broader universe of drugs, medical therapies, agrochemical
products, vaccines, and other products derived from genetic resources not regulated by other international instruments
(although its relationship with the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework is disputed). 321  In short, the
Nagoya Protocol, another agreement formed subsequent to the Convention on Biological Diversity, regulates access to
genetic resources in party states and establishes mechanisms for “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the
utilisation of genetic resources.” 322
Countries adopting legislation or regulation pursuant to the Nagoya Protocol ensure that access to any genetic resources
within the territory of that country is conditioned on prior informed consent not only of the country of origin, but also on
access being “[i]n accordance with domestic law” and on the consent of indigenous and local communities. 323  Moreover,
once access to genetic resources results in a commercially viable product:
*955  [B]enefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications and
commercialization shall be shared in a fair and equitable way with the Party providing such resources that
is the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance
with the Convention. 324
The precise nature of benefit sharing, both monetary and nonmonetary, is left to the states themselves to negotiate with
those who generate commercialized products.
South Africa's Regulations on Bio-Prospecting, Access and Benefit-Sharing, for example, require firms to obtain a permit
from the government if they intend to use South African genetic resources for research or patenting. 325  These permits
can only be obtained with a benefit-sharing agreement with relevant stakeholders. 326  South Africa integrates this system
with its patent application system as well, such that patent applications must identify indigenous biological resources or
forms of traditional knowledge leading to the patentable subject matter. 327  As of 2016, only nineteen countries and the
EU submitted legislative, administrative, or policy measures in furtherance of the Nagoya Protocol, but its potential to
shape the scope of intellectual property rights, especially patents, is clear. 328
Indeed, the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising Out
of Their Utilization (Bonn Guidelines), a set of voluntary guidelines issued subsequent to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, but before the Nagoya Protocol, recommended the following provisions for contracts between sovereign states
and commercial entities:
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(a) Regulating the use of resources in order to take into account ethical concerns of the particular Parties
and stakeholders, in particular indigenous and local communities concerned;
(b) Making provision to ensure the continued customary use of genetic resources and related knowledge;
*956  (c) Provision for the use of intellectual property rights include joint research, obligation to implement
rights on inventions obtained and to provide licences by common consent;
(d) The possibility of joint ownership of intellectual property rights according to the degree of
contribution. 329
The Bonn Guidelines similarly suggest that parties might condition transfer of material on a promise not to seek
intellectual property rights at all. 330
Countries like India and Peru have used the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Nagoya Protocol to aggressively
police both access based on informed consent and benefit sharing with parties and indigenous communities and to
share its policies internationally. The Indian government has created a Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, which
stores Indian traditional medicine treatments and is accessible to patent offices around the world. 331  Peru's National
Commission Against Biopiracy has used its database records to oppose the grant of patents containing Peruvian
traditional knowledge. 332
Like the International Seed Treaty, the world's major economic powers (with substantial intellectual property right-
holding constituencies) are not parties to the Nagoya Protocol. Early experience suggests that the Nagoya Protocol
shares weaknesses and lacunae with the International Seed Treaty. For example, in 2010, a subsidiary of Nestlé filed
international patent applications for therapeutic derivatives of rooibos and honeybush, plants indigenous to South
Africa, and obtained them without the required permits under the legislation implementing the Nagoya Protocol in
South Africa. 333
Nestlé claimed that it had neither sourced the plants in South Africa nor researched them there (claiming instead that they
were provided by South African suppliers of other goods), it had not yet *957  commercialized any products (although
that was not relevant under South African law), and it would comply with the law when, or if, it became necessary. 334
The case highlights the ambiguities in the Nagoya Protocol, not only over what constitutes covered material and conduct
regulated by the Protocol, but also what relationship third parties may play in evading the Protocol's reach.
E. The International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes
The International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (International Code), like the WHO's Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness Framework, is, legally speaking, only a recommendation adopted under article 23 of the WHO
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Constitution, rather than a more formally binding treaty or international agreement. 335  However, the recommendation
is an evidence-based standard adopted by international food safety bodies and is independently influential as a human
rights norm. 336
The International Code seeks to prevent companies from advertising; implement strict labeling requirements, including
a proscription on infant images or other pictures that idealize breast-milk substitutes; limit influence on health care
workers; and prohibit distribution of free samples of breast-milk substitutes. 337  Eighty-four states have enacted
legislation enacting all or some aspects of the International Code, while another fourteen have legislation pending. 338
While the text of the International Code does not address trademarks as explicitly as the WHO's FCTC, the Code
prohibits “pictures of infants [and] other pictures or text which may idealize the use of infant formula.” 339  Major infant
formula markets like Brazil, China, and India have banned the use of images on infant formula *958  containers, while
a growing number of developing and wealthy countries are considering stronger measures to limit the appearance or use
of trademarks in connection with infant formula. 340
Codex, the joint international organization run by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and the WHO, has
adopted the relevant trademark restricting provisions of the International Code into its Standard for Infant Formula
and Formulas for Special Medical Purposes Intended for Infants, which allows states to require that infant formula
“label[s] . . . have no pictures of infants and women nor any other picture or text which idealizes the use of infant
formula.” 341  As the standard-setting body for the WTO's Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 342
the adoption of the standard means that parties to the WTO may ban images of infants and women without concern
that it may inappropriately burden trade. While the Codex standard operates separately from measures sanctioned by
TRIPS, the standard effectively creates a safe harbor for banning trademarks on infant formula products. Indeed, despite
industry protest against states and other political entities, like Hong Kong, that have restricted or banned trademarks on
infant formula, no state has brought a challenge to those restrictions at the WTO, nor has any of the major food firms
used the strong enforcement mechanisms available through BITs to protest prohibitions on infant images. 343
F. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Because tobacco consumption has declined in Europe and North America as a result of strong public health measures
and taxation policies, 344  the global tobacco industry has focused on low- and middle-income countries as key targets
to sustain demand for *959  conventional cigarettes. 345  In developing and wealthy markets, tobacco trademarks play
a critical role in the broader advertising, promotion, and marketing efforts that persuade young men and women to
commit to, and identify with, a specific brand of cigarette.
Trademarks must not only appeal to this target demographic, but must also frame and shape the act of consuming
cigarettes as less dangerous. Framing includes minimizing or obfuscating mandatory health warnings, using descriptors
like “mild,” “light,” and “ultra-light,” and shaping cigarette containers--for example, to mimic famous perfume
packaging--to appeal to target populations. 346  Cigarette manufacturers also use package colors and images to shape
health perceptions. Two aspects of trademarks magnify these public health problems in low- and middle-income
countries. First, low- and middle-income countries have larger populations who lack the functional literacy necessary for
written warnings that communicate product risks. Therefore, regulation of pictures and images is necessary for effective
regulation. Second, trademarks in the cigarette context are explicitly tied to the rise of middle-income classes in wealthier
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countries. Indeed, the global morbidity and mortality burden associated with tobacco consumption now falls heaviest
on low- and middle-income countries. 347
Motivated by the public health burden imposed by tobacco products and the success of the industry in thwarting
regulation, frequently on intellectual property grounds, Canada, Finland, Mexico, and Tanzania sponsored the idea for
an international agreement 348  to regulate tobacco at the WHA in 1995. 349  In 1998, member states established a WHO
FCTC Working Group to draft core treaty elements and an intergovernmental negotiating body to develop the text of
the treaty. 350  Member states adopted the treaty in 2003, and it *960  entered into force on February 27, 2005. 351  One
hundred and seventy-seven parties have ratified or acceded to the FCTC as of September 2013. 352
While the FCTC covers a wide range of supply and demand factors affecting tobacco consumption, core aspects
of its nonprice provisions are aimed at eliminating or limiting trademark protection in the tobacco context. Article
11 (packaging and labeling) and article 13 (promotion) include provisions curtailing trademark rights. 353  The
governing body of the treaty has included additional guidelines that further erode international protections for tobacco
trademarks. 354
Section 1(a) of article 11 regulating packaging and labeling provides that each party will take measures to ensure that
tobacco product packaging and labelling do not promote a tobacco product by any means that are false,
misleading, deceptive or likely to create an erroneous impression about the product's characteristics, health
effects, hazards or emissions, including any term, descriptor, trademark or figurative or other sign that
directly or indirectly creates the false impression that a particular tobacco product is less harmful than
others. 355
In addition, section 1(b) of article 11 requires that packages carry health warnings describing the harmful effects of
tobacco use that must cover no less than 30% of the principal display area, but recommends coverage of 50% or more
of the display area. 356
The guidelines for the implementation of article 11 state that countries should consider regulatory measures that
effectively eliminate the use or effectiveness of trademarks. 357  Paragraph 7 recommends large, graphic health warnings
because they are more noticeable, better communicate health risks, provoke a greater emotional response, and increase
motivation to quit or decrease tobacco consumption. 358  Paragraph 8 provides that health warnings should be located
on both the front and back of the package, at the top *961  of all principal display areas. 359  Paragraph 9 suggests that
health warnings should also be located on all sides of the package, inserts, and onserts. 360  Referencing article 11.1(b)(v),
paragraph 12 of the guidelines encourages parties to require health warnings that cover more than 50% of the principal
display areas, 361  and paragraph 16 recommends that these warnings should be pictorial because they will “disrupt the
impact of brand imagery” and the overall attractiveness of the package. 362
Paragraph 43 affects words and phrases that would normally be subject to trademark protection. It provides a
nonexhaustive list of terms, as mentioned in article 11.1(a), which “creates the false impression that a particular tobacco
product is less harmful than others.” 363  Paragraphs 8, 10, and 54 address obstruction of warnings by other elements of
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packaging or trade dress. 364  Paragraph 8 states that health warnings should not be damaged or concealed by the normal
opening of the package. 365  Paragraph 10 reiterates the need for warnings to remain unobstructed by other elements
of the packaging, such as labelling markings, inserts, and onserts. 366  Finally, paragraph 54 indicates that warnings
should not be obscured, obliterated, or undermined by extraneous adhesive labels, stickers, cases, covers, sleeves, and
wrappings. 367  Paragraph 46 addresses plain packaging:
Parties should consider adopting measures to restrict or prohibit the use of logos, colours, brand images or
promotional information on packaging other than brand names and product names displayed in a standard
colour and font style (plain packaging). This may increase the noticeability and effectiveness of health
warnings and messages, prevent the package from detracting attention from them, and address industry
package design techniques that may suggest that some products are less harmful than others. 368
Article 13 on advertising, promotion, and sponsorship also affects trademark rights. 369  Sections 2 and 3 of article
13 require a party, subject to its constitutional principles, either to ban or to apply *962  restrictions on tobacco
advertising, promotion, and sponsorship. 370  Section 4 sets minimum standards, subject to the national constitution, for
restrictions on tobacco advertising. 371  It requires a prohibition on all forms of advertising, promotion, and sponsorship
that promote tobacco by means that are false, misleading, deceptive, or likely to create an erroneous impression about
its characteristics, health effects, hazards, or emissions; 372  that health warnings accompany all tobacco advertising; 373
a ban or restrictions on tobacco advertising, promotion, or sponsorship on radio, television, print media, and other
media as appropriate; 374  and a prohibition or restriction on tobacco sponsorship of international events, activities, or
participants. 375
Several countries, including Uruguay, 376  Thailand, 377  and India, 378  have implemented or introduced legislation to
implement plain packaging or similar restrictions on tobacco products. Uruguay became the first country to introduce
substantial (80%) trademark restrictions and pictorial warnings in 2009. 379  Uruguay's primary tobacco packaging
provisions require that packs be covered by graphic warnings, with images such as rotting teeth and premature babies,
to discourage smoking. 380  In addition, a firm may not sell different brand variants, which means tobacco firms may
not use variants on words like “light” to shape health perceptions of its products. 381
*963  Following Uruguay, Australia introduced plain packaging in December 2013. 382  Under Australia's legislation,
packs must be a standard, dark brown color 383  and comply with the following structural aspects: they must have no
decorative ridges, embossing, bulges, or irregularities in shape or texture; 384  the edges must be ridged, straight, and not
beveled or otherwise shaped or embellished in any way; 385  packs may not make a noise or produce a scent that could
be construed as advertising or promotion; 386  they may not include features intended to change after sale, such as heat-
activated inks or inks that are visible only in certain light; 387  and they may not include inserts or onserts. 388  Packs
may only state the brand and variant name in a font, size, and color that is uniform across all brands 389  and may not
display any trademarks or other identifying marks. 390  In addition, packs are required to display large health warnings
with graphics and explanatory messages over at least 75% of the front surface of tobacco packaging and 75-90% of the
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back surface. 391  The paper casings of cigarettes are also regulated; they must either be white or white with an imitation
cork tip. 392
The FCTC has so far proved effective at creating a safe regulatory space for the modification or elimination of tobacco
trademarks. Plain packaging has survived in Australia due in part to its adoption pursuant to the FCTC. 393  While there
is as yet no arbitration decision based on expropriation of tobacco trademarks, the FCTC has provided an important
legal basis for Australia and Uruguay to claim that no award is appropriate in light of a binding multilateral *964
agreement that modifies trademark protections otherwise available in their BITs. 394
There are weaknesses, although ostensibly fewer of them, with the FCTC as well. Much of the language in the FCTC,
and nearly all that used in the guidelines, is precatory, and there have been wide variations in implementation. 395  A
subsequent protocol to the FCTC on illicit trade in tobacco products allowed countries to effectively use TRIPS as an
alternative to other protocol measures. 396  Separately, tobacco firms have become involved in drafting international
trade agreements to strengthen intellectual property protections in light of trends in FCTC implementation. PMI, for
example, has lobbied the USTR to include strong investment protections for tobacco trademarks in the proposed
TPP. 397
V. THE DESIGN AND OBJECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SHELTERS
Taken together, the aforementioned international agreements regulate intellectual property by creating conditions for
access to patentable subject matter, eliminating or substantially modifying trademarks at their core level (i.e., by source
identification), and redistributing the benefits of intellectual property that either draw from the resources of low- and
middle-income countries or dispropor-tionately affect their welfare, or both. Heretofore, these agreements have been
understood to represent advances of one sort or another in their respective contexts: environmental law, indigenous
peoples' law, public health law, or the law of biological diversity. More are coming. In 2010, Thailand introduced large
graphic warning labels for alcohol containers some years after public health advocates argued that the WHO should
develop a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control *965  modeled on the FCTC. 398  Argentina and Brazil have
called for a reorientation of WIPO, which may include a so-called “access to knowledge” treaty. 399
There are at least two key implications for understanding biodiversity and public health treaties as part of a wider trend
of resistance to expansive intellectual property protections asserted through bilateral and multilateral investment and
trade treaties. First, forming parallel agreements that curtail or modify intellectual property rights may be just as or more
effective than leveraging flexibilities under current investment and trade instruments or using hard-nosed negotiation
over intellectual property protections in new treaties. Current scholars tend to emphasize the use of intellectual property
framing as part of wider mobilization of social movements contesting the expansion of intellectual property rights
through international agreements. 400  In her thoughtful study of “the new politics of intellectual property,” for example,
Amy Kapczynski notes widespread protests against TRIPS in India, the failure of the Clinton Administration to
effect a range of digital copyright treaties, and the efforts to reorient WIPO toward a “development agenda” are
part of the success that counter-intellectual-property mobilization forces have enjoyed by framing many development
and human rights issues as fundamentally about “intellectual property.” 401  But of the international agreements that
have experienced the most success in curtailing intellectual property rights (with the possible exception of the Doha
Declaration), the 1981 International Code and the FCTC effectively used individual and public health threats as subtle
means by which to circumvent strong trademark protections in specific contexts.
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Second, understanding the growing network of intellectual property that explicitly curtails intellectual property rights
in areas like agriculture and public health as a discrete corpus of international economic law opens new possibilities for
understanding the *966  circumstances under which international intellectual property shelters form, as well as under
what conditions they may achieve their objectives. There are at least two of these factors worth exploring further: the
nature of the global market in which shelters form and the process by which firms within that market are allowed to
participate in the establishment and processes of the shelters. The purpose of this discussion is simply to provide an
overview of the value of understanding the agreements discussed in Part IV as a cohesive whole, not to provide an
exhaustive evaluation of the factors affecting international intellectual property shelters' targets and designs, which are
elaborated elsewhere.
A. Global Concentration of Knowledge-Intensive Industries
The emergence of international intellectual property shelters coincides almost precisely with the global concentration of
the industries that have most aggressively asserted their intellectual property rights. For example, the 1981 International
Code is effectively a Nestle-specific agreement, which, even in 1981, controlled 50% of the global infant formula
market. 402  When Canada, Finland, Tanzania, and Mexico introduced the idea of a global tobacco control treaty at
the WHO, four corporations controlled 75% of the global tobacco market and already demonstrated a strong ability
to shape health perceptions of their products through the use of their trademarks. 403  Of the forty-two members of the
Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers Association that existed in 1988, only eleven remained as of 2012. 404
Similar consolidation occurred in the proprietary seed and agrochemical markets, in which four firms control 56% of
the global market. 405  Indeed, until recently, the division between pharmaceutical and agrochemical corporations was
not so clear. The Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis formed after a merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz and
consolidated massive pharmaceutical and *967  agrochemical units. 406  In 2000, Novartis spun off its agrochemical
unit into Syngenta, the world's third largest seed and agrochemical company, which draws more than half its sales from
emerging markets. 407  Syngenta is now in merger negotiations with Monsanto, which holds the world's largest share of
the global commercial seed market. 408  Bayer, which controls more of the global market of seeds and agrochemicals than
any other firm except Monsanto, maintains a substantial share of the global pharmaceutical market, although much
less than Johnson & Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline, and Pfizer. 409  Crosslicensing between these firms in specific product
sectors means even tighter concentration than market share alone suggests. 410
The corresponding capacity of those firms to control and/or influence forms of knowledge, or otherwise use their market
positions to influence population health outcomes (e.g., relating to tobacco), prompted the development of treaties to
constrain their behavior. Indeed, it was the formation of the large network of international investment and trade treaties
that had allowed global consolidation to occur in the medicines, seeds, and tobacco contexts.
That international intellectual property shelters are in fact efforts at supranational regulation of global firms is supported
by the perceptions of the firms themselves. When momentum picked up for the establishment of an international
agreement regulating the use of infant images and other visuals to promote breast-milk substitutes, Nestlé established a
central office under the control of its chief operating officer to coordinate the responses of each global market. 411  The
global tobacco industry put the conceptual notion of supranational regulation at the core of its fierce resistance to the
FCTC. In one of its many communications regarding the treaty, British American Tobacco argued that supranational
regulation was warranted “‘only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved’
by individual countries,” a line echoed in submissions by *968  Brown & Williamson to the U.S. Department of Health
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and Human Services. 412  Because tobacco control measures could be adopted at the national level, the argument went,
there was no need for an international instrument. 413  PMI endeavored to discredit the WHO as a tobacco regulatory
body and sought to weaken the treaty through its influence on the U.S. delegation. 414
The global pharmaceutical industry similarly tended to discuss broad access-to-medicines agreements and frameworks
in terms of their regulatory nature. Reacting to the ways in which the Doha Declaration altered the global landscape of
pharmaceutical patents, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA), the
global pharmaceutical trade group, argued that compulsory licenses “are certainly not a solution to access problems”
and that “frequent use of them could discourage the introduction of new medicines . . . and . . . undermine[s] the system
that underpins the ability of the private sector to undertake essential R&D [[[(research and development)].” 415  The
negotiations over the establishment of the WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework were viewed, at least by
the IFPMA, as fundamentally about what level of supranational regulation would be imposed for them to participate
in the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response network for virus samples with pandemic potential. 416
B. The Design of International Intellectual Property Shelters
If international intellectual property shelters are effectively low- and middle-income country-led efforts to regulate
knowledge- *969  intensive firms at the international level, then it is also plausible that those regulatory regimes may
be captured, restrained, or effectively structured to secure important public interests like health protection and food
security. It is far too early to assess the relative strength of the shelters identified above in facilitating their stated objectives
like protecting individuals from the health perceptions trademarks shape, ensuring that patents and data exclusivity do
not erect insuperable barriers to access to medicines, or preserving traditional forms of agriculture and seed exchange.
However, it is possible to identify different aspects of how international intellectual property shelters are constructed and
at least preliminary reasons to believe that some regulatory designs may better promote welfare-enhancing objectives
than others.
Within the shelters identified above, some entirely barred participation by regulated firms, while others included them
as integral parts of the negotiation process. The WHO allowed participation by “representatives of non-Member States,
of liberation movements referred to in resolution WHA27.37, of organizations of the U.N. system, of intergovernmental
organizations with which WHO has established effective relations, and of nongovernmental organizations in official
relations with WHO,” effectively cutting global tobacco firms out of the official treaty drafting process (although
they could and did participate as part of national delegations). 417  The FCTC codified this norm in article 5.3, which
required parties to protect their health policies from tobacco industry interests, made even stronger in guidelines issued
by the Conference of the Parties, which declared a “fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the tobacco
industry's interests and public health” and set forth recommendations that, at their strongest, quashed tobacco company
participation in the policy-making process altogether. 418
The International Code, by contrast, involved regulated firms from its first draft. Not only were infant formula company
representatives from nine countries consulted by WHO drafters, but also by the global trade group, the International
Council of Infant Food Industries. 419  Similarly, the WHO's Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework could not
have materialized, at least in its present form, without the participation of the major global pharmaceutical firms because
they not only promise to share benefits of participation in the *970  Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System,
but they also fund its operation. 420
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Between full participation and prohibition of formal participation exist a number of possibilities, including participation
as part of national delegations, the forms of influence firms may exercise through each channel, and what role, if any,
direct financial support for negotiations or shelter mechanisms may play. Each of these factors may influence the extent
to which a given international intellectual property shelter effectively reorients intellectual property rights from private
wealth accumulation to redistribution or furtherance of global population health and nutrition outcomes.
International intellectual property shelters similarly may void an entire class or category of intellectual property, alter
the ways in which intellectual property protection affects prices, or condition access to promising sources of intellectual
property on redistribution of benefits thereby derived. The FCTC, for example, explicitly calls for states to adopt
measures that ensure that “trademark[s do not] directly or indirectly create[] [a] false impression that a particular
tobacco product is less harmful than other tobacco products.” 421  It implicitly regulates trademarks by recommending
large, graphic warnings as part of tobacco product labeling. 422  The International Code similarly urges prohibitions on
“pictures of infants, [and] other pictures or text which may idealize the use of infant formula.” 423
The WHO's expert report calling for an international treaty to address the development of drugs and products that
focus on the needs of low- and middle-income countries urges the delinking of innovation costs and product prices
to condition coverage of research costs on open knowledge research and development and open innovation models in
which research costs are covered by public or philanthropic sources and research results are made available in the public
domain, licensing conditions imposed by funders or research organizations permit nonexclusive licensing or prescribe a
low target price for a product, and prize funds involve separate payments to compensate for the costs of research and
development and prescribe either predetermined product prices at a low level or permit competitive *971  manufacture
of developed products; “more comprehensive schemes . . . envisage wholesale replacement of the intellectual property
system by government-funded payments for R&D.” 424
The WHO Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework conditions access to biological materials collected through
the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) on promises to provide pandemic vaccines, share
intellectual property, or share doses of antiviral medicines, as well as requiring pharmaceutical, medical device, and
diagnostic firms to pay for half of the GISRS system. 425
Whatever the context, international intellectual property shelters are at least in part a result of globalization at its
core. The emergence of a small number of global firms that dominate knowledge-intensive markets was made possible
through the expanding network of trade and investment treaties. The dependence of those firms on legal protections
for intangible assets has encouraged them to persistently press for stronger intellectual property laws even in contexts
in which substantial public interests may require more flexibility. In those contexts, international intellectual property
shelters mediate the creation, flow, and concentration of global wealth between wealthy and low- or middle-income
countries. Each of these aspects of the development of international intellectual property shelters demands treatment far
more extensive than what is allowed here. This Article has endeavored only to argue that these phenomena should be
understood as a cohesive body of international economic law, studied as part of the response to growing international
intellectual property protections and evaluated for their purposes and designs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Confrontations between expanding intellectual property rights and the development interests of low- and middle-income
states are now poised to increase as international agreements addressing both proliferate. 426  This Article argues that
agreements to preserve access to medicines, protect population health, and ensure food security should be seen not
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only as responses to the overreach of international intellectual property agreements, but also as forms of supranational
regulation over highly concentrated global industries that benefit most *972  from the privatization of knowledge
creation. That assertion necessarily entails study of the structure of global businesses working in these areas, as well as
the governments with which those businesses are affiliated or look to for support and promotion. As forms of regulation,
international intellectual property shelters' designs will ultimately determine how well they achieve their objectives,
whether those are protections of global public welfare or merely efforts to redistribute wealth from rich to poor or vice
versa, and in which contexts additional shelters are likely to emerge. This Article has endeavored to take the first of these
steps by identifying a heretofore unrecognized phenomenon at work in international economic law.
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